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Since 2014, British schools have been required to ‘actively promote’ the value of 
‘mutual respect’ to the children in their care. This is relatively unproblematic: liberals 
are agreed that good citizenship education will involve teaching mutual respect. 
However, there is disagreement over how ‘respect’ should be understood and what it 
should imply for norms of respectful classroom discussion. Some political liberals 
have indicated that when engaging in discussion in the classroom, students should 
provide only neutral reasons to defend their views. This paper provides a number of 
arguments against this claim. For example, I argue that this norm relies on a 
distorted understanding of what it is to respect others and that it stifles the 
development of civic and epistemic virtue in the next generation of citizens. Even 
from within the perspective of political liberalism, there are good reasons to favour 
critical discussion of non-neutral reasons. Education policy should therefore accord 
greater priority to discussion of students’ actual motivating reasons than to 
discussion constrained by a norm of neutral discourse. 
 
1. Introduction: Teaching respect in schools 
Liberals are agreed that an important aim of civic education is to cultivate mutual respect. 
This is the case across the division line between comprehensive and political liberals, who 
disagree over the role that values such as autonomy and individuality should play in political 
justification.1 Despite this agreement, it is seldom fleshed out how ‘mutual respect’ is to be 
understood or what its implications are for classroom practice. Specifically, it is unclear what 
norms are implied for respectful classroom discussion: should students be taught that 
respect requires that they provide neutral reasons in defence of their views? 
These questions have gained new urgency in light of recent educational policy. Since 2014, 
the British Government has required that all schools ‘actively promote … mutual respect and 
tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs’, alongside other ‘British values’.2 Schools 
‘must now have a clear strategy for embedding these values’ and the success of this 
strategy is part of the inspection process. In the official statement that accompanied the 
guidelines, Lord Nash stated that the Government wants to ensure that ‘young people 
                                                          
1
 Comprehensive liberals allow that political principles be justified with reference to liberal values such 
as autonomy or individuality, whereas political liberals seek to justify political principles with 
references to values that all reasonable people can accept. For the view that liberals unite over the 
importance of mutual respect, see Amy Gutmann, ‘Civic Education and Social Diversity’, Ethics 105 
(1995), 557–579 and Blain Neufeld, ‘Political Liberalism and Citizenship Education’, Philosophy 
Compass 8/9 (2013), 781–797, 787. 
2
 Department of Education, ‘Promoting fundamental British values as part of SMSC in schools’. Online 
(November 2014). Retrieved 9 August 2017 from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/380595/SMSC_Guidan
ce_Maintained_Schools.pdf. Since not all British people agree on these values, nor are these values 




understand the importance of respect and leave school fully prepared for life in modern 
Britain’.3  
This policy is born out of Prevent, a branch of the Government’s counter-terrorism and de-
radicalization programme. But it is also part of a more general project of educating for 
citizenship. Lord Nash expressed his hope that teaching these values will help children to 
become ‘valuable and fully rounded members of society’. 
Given that this ‘British values’ policy is in place in a multicultural society where people 
disagree over (1) what we should value and (2) how values such as ‘respect’ and ‘tolerance’ 
should be to interpreted and applied, one way to make sense of this requirement is by 
allowing these values to be both promoted and questioned through classroom discussion of 
controversial issues. 4 This fits well with a growing consensus over the importance of critical 
discussion in the classroom. 5 In the UK, the home of such discussions, if they take place, is 
usually Religious Education, PSHE or Citizenship. In the US, the home of such discussions, 
if they take place, is usually Social Studies. 
In all these contexts, a question arises of what ‘respectful’ discussion of controversial issues 
should look like in practice. Put more abstractly, given that education is (in part) a 
preparation for civic life, what should be taught as norms for respectful discussion? 
 
2. Respect, political liberalism and neutral discourse 
Some trends in political liberal thought point to the idea that neutral reason-giving should be 
a norm of respectful discussion. Charles Larmore argues that when two people disagree, 
‘each should prescind from the beliefs that the other rejects’6, ‘retreating to neutral ground, to 
the beliefs they still share’7. The thought, shared by other political liberals, is that when 
deliberating together about political issues, we should argue using ‘public’ or ‘neutral’ 
reasons. 8 I use these terms interchangeably to refer to reasons that do not rely on accepting 
                                                          
3
 Department of Education, ‘Guidance on promoting British values in schools published’. Online Press 
Release (27 November 2014). Retrieved 9 August 2017 from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/guidance-on-promoting-british-values-in-schools-published. 
4
 For some brief arguments in favour of critical discussion of ‘British values’, see Christina Easton, 
‘How to teach children about tolerance – and its limits’, Times Literary Supplement. Online (18 July 
2017). Retrieved 9 August 2017 from https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/public/tolerance-ethics-
students-education/. 
5 See, for example, the work of Generation Global (https://generation.global/how-it-works, retrieved 22 
September 2017). On the importance of discussion, see Kenneth Primrose, ‘Religious Education - 
reclaiming what is being lost’, Theos. Online (18 September 2017). Retrieved 22 September 2017 
from http://www.theosthinktank.co.uk/comment/2017/09/18/religious-education-reclaiming-what-is-
being-lost. Cf. Angie Hobbs, ‘How teaching philosophy could help combat extremism’, The 
Conversation. Online (16 March 2017). Retrieved 9 August 2017 from 
https://theconversation.com/how-teaching-philosophy-could-help-combat-extremism-74386. For 
arguments and evidence of the benefits of students engaging in critical discussion of controversial 
issues in Social Studies classes in the US, see D. E. Hess and P. McAvoy, The Political Classroom: 
Evidence and Ethics in Democratic Education (New York: Routledge, 2015). 
6
 Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 53. 
7
 Charles Larmore, ‘Political Liberalism’, Political Theory 18: 3 (1990), 339–360, 347. Henceforth, ‘PL’. 
8
 See Bruce Ackerman ‘Why Dialogue?’, Journal of Philosophy 86: 1 (1989), 5–22; Larmore, Patterns 
(op. cit. n.6); John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Expanded Edition) (New York: Columbia University 




a particular, controversial conception of the good or ‘comprehensive doctrine’.9 Public 
reasons offer grounds that all reasonable people can accept, independently of their views on 
more controversial matters.10 
For Larmore and others, this ideal of public discourse is motivated by respect for persons.11 
The concept of respect at play here is broadly Kantian. However, it does not require uptake 
of the Kantian view of autonomy and personhood: one need not accept that critical self-
reflection, encapsulated by the motto ‘Sapere aude’, is essential to the good life.12 From the 
political liberal perspective, to require this would be to commit the comprehensive liberal 
mistake of relying on controversial values that not all reasonable people accept. Instead, 
Larmore appeals to a minimal idea of personhood as ‘simply the capacity of thinking and 
acting on the basis of reasons’.13 This is a form of ‘recognition respect’; recognising this 
feature in a person imposes a constraint on how you may treat them.14 Specifically, 
recognition of a person’s rational nature means that it is wrong to force someone to comply, 
for this would not be ‘engaging directly their distinctive capacity as persons’.15 In Larmore’s 
words, ‘to respect another person as an end is to insist that coercive or political principles be 
as justifiable to that person as they are to us’.16 So, to be respectful, we should provide 
grounds that will draw on the reason of our opponent. 
A similar idea is found in John Rawls’ Political Liberalism. In order to be a legitimate exercise 
of power, political decisions must be justifiable to the people they constrain. Out of respect 
for citizens as free and equal, political decisions must be made on the basis of public 
reasons.17 Therefore, to the extent that citizens are involved in the decision-making 
procedure, their deliberations must also be on the basis of public reasons. Thus, we have an 
ideal in political liberalism that civic discourse should be neutral discourse. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
justice’, but he does also say that ‘it is usually highly desirable to settle political questions by invoking 
the values of public reason’ (215). Larmore specifies that he does not see the liberal ideal of political 
neutrality as applicable to public discussion generally, and allows that sometimes we engage in 
discussion with the aim of convincing others of the worth of our views about the good life (PL, 348 and 
Patterns, 47). However, as we shall see, it has been common for political liberals drawing on these 
works to take neutrality as applying to public discourse more generally.  
9
 ‘Conception of the good’ and ‘comprehensive doctrine’ have varied definitions in the literature. I take 
‘comprehensive doctrine’ to have broader scope, and use it to refer to a view (or set of beliefs) held by 
an individual or group that have implications for how we should live. These include beliefs about the 
nature and constitutive elements of a valuable life, but may also include metaphysical beliefs that 
impact upon questions of how we should live, such as beliefs about the status of a foetus. Importantly, 
these beliefs are controversial; not every reasonable person accepts them. 
10
 The notion of ‘reasonable’ does important work for political liberals, yet its definition is controversial. 
Rawls suggests ‘reasonable’ has two aspects (op. cit. n.8, 54). Firstly, a willingness to propose, and 
abide by, fair terms of co-operation. Secondly, a recognition that since reasonable and rational people 
can arrive at different, sometimes conflicting comprehensive views, it would be wrong for exercises of 
political power to be based in non-public reasons (138). 
11
 See also Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 159 
and George Klosko, ‘Reasonable Rejection and Neutrality of Justification’, in Perfectionism and 
Neutrality ed. S. Wall & G. Klosko (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 167–89. 
12
 Immanuel Kant, ‘An answer to the question: What is Enlightenment?’, in Practical Philosophy ed. M. 
J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
13
 Larmore, PL (op. cit. n.7), 349. 
14
 S. L. Darwall, ‘Two Kinds of Respect’, Ethics 88:1 (1977), 36–49. 
15
 Larmore, PL (op. cit. n.7), 348. 
16
 Larmore, PL (op. cit. n.7), 349. 
17





3. The application of neutral discourse to education 
If public reason-giving is a key part of ideal civic discourse, then learning to argue in this way 
should form an important part of civic education. It should be taught as a norm of respectful 
classroom discussion of civic issues. This case can be made more strongly if we see 
schools not as part of what Rawls calls the ‘background culture’, but as part of the basic 
structure of society, where public reason applies. 18 According to this view, classrooms are a 
public space, where teachers act in the role of an ‘agent of the state’ and therefore are 
required to be neutral. 19 The teacher must only give reasons that all reasonable people can 
accept, and should encourage students to do the same. 20 
The implication that classroom discussions should be guided by a norm of neutral discourse 
has seldom been brought out by political liberals. Matthew Clayton comes close, in arguing 
that ‘children should be raised to appreciate the merits of deliberation through public reason 
and taught the associated virtue of political restraint’.21 The most explicit endorsement of this 
norm comes from Blain Neufeld and Gordon Davis (N&D).22 They offer what they argue is 
the Rawlsian position: 
‘A political liberal civic education would teach students the skills and concepts 
necessary for them to interact with other citizens on the basis of civic respect. This 
would involve teaching them that … they cannot appeal to reasons that depend on 
the truth or correctness of their particular comprehensive doctrines when deciding 
fundamental political issues.’23 
N&D propose that this can be achieved as follows. Students should be required to 
participate in debates on ‘politically divisive’ issues, where the ‘rules of the debate’ are such 
that they are only allowed to provide public reasons. Reasons that rely on comprehensive 
doctrines will be ‘ruled inadmissible’. This exercise will ‘help students appreciate the 
importance of not justifying political actions on partisan religious grounds’. 24 
We can strengthen N&D’s case by adding that not only will this help students appreciate the 
importance of giving public reasons, but it also enables them to recognise these reasons and 
practise formulating them. Recognising the difference between someone disagreeing with 
you because they do not share your comprehensive doctrine and someone disagreeing with 
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 Rawls (op. cit. n.8), 14. It is not clear whether Rawls views schools as part of the basic structure. 
For the view that they are, see Martha Nussbaum, ‘Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism’, 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 39:1 (2011), 3–45, 38–9 and Neufeld (op. cit. n.1), 793, n.4. 
19
 Nussbaum (op. cit. n.19), 39, n. 65. 
20
 I do not address the issue of the extent to which teachers should be neutral (although see §E for 
some relevant discussion). For a detailed treatment of this issue, alongside the results of a large, 
mixed-methods study, see Hess and McAvoy (op. cit. n.5).  
21
 Matthew Clayton, Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
148. 
22
 Blain Neufeld and Gordon Davis, ‘Civic Respect, Civic Education, and the Family’, Educational 
Philosophy and Theory 42:1 (2010), 94–111. 
23
 N&D (op. cit. n.23), 98. 
24




you because they think that you have given a poor quality public justification is difficult, and 
so is a skill that requires practice.25 
N&D’s practical proposal is also motivated by the need to find a way to promote political 
autonomy in students without, at the same time, promoting moral autonomy. Moral 
autonomy involves critical reflection on one’s life as a whole and so has wider scope than 
political autonomy. Rawls explains that his political liberalism only ‘affirms political 
autonomy’, which includes ‘participating in society’s public affairs and sharing in its collective 
self-determination over time’. It ‘leaves the weight of ethical autonomy to be decided by 
citizens severally in light of their comprehensive doctrines’.26 Since the value of moral 
autonomy is controversial, classes that encourage students to critically reflect on their 
comprehensive doctrines should be offered, but not required.27 To require it would be to 
promote moral autonomy and therefore this policy would not be justifiable to all reasonable 
citizens.28 In contrast, even from the minimalist perspective of political liberalism, the 
development of political autonomy is required. And, since it is part of showing ‘civic respect’ 
that ‘citizens employ the ideas and values of public reason when deciding fundamental 
political questions’, practices necessary for learning this skill (such as N&D’s proposed 
practice of debates restrained by a norm of neutral discourse) should be part of the 
compulsory curriculum.29 
There is a further, important implication of N&D’s view. Since there is no requirement for 
children to encounter comprehensive doctrines that differ from their own, their view does not 
push towards the ‘common school ideal’, where children from a diversity of racial, cultural, 
religious and socio-economic backgrounds are brought together. Learning the art of public 
reason-giving can, in theory, be achieved in a homogenous setting, with others who share 
one’s comprehensive doctrine. Homogenous schools (such as faith schools), where students 
are not exposed to different comprehensive doctrines, are therefore permissible.30  
 
4. Non-neutral discourse and discussion of comprehensive doctrines 
In opposition to N&D, I will argue that students should be encouraged to bring all (relevant) 
reasons, including those based in their comprehensive doctrines, into class discussions of 
controversial issues. Engaging with discussion of comprehensive doctrines is more 
important from the perspective of essential civic virtues than is practising the art of public 
reason-giving. This should, therefore, be part of the compulsory curriculum. 
To summarise, I disagree with N&D over two related issues: 
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 Kent Greenawalt acknowledges this difficulty when he says that as things stand, citizens cannot be 
expected to draw this distinction. He suggests that perhaps citizens of a ‘highly educated, 
participating citizenry’ could. This leaves open that we should be training the next generation of 
citizens so that they are equipped to understand and utilise this distinction. See Kent Greenawalt, 
‘Religion, Law and Politics: Arenas of Neutrality’, in Perfectionism and Neutrality ed. S. Wall & G. 
Klosko (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 257–80, 272. 
26
 Rawls (op. cit. n.8), 78. 
27
 Neufeld (op. cit. n.1), 784, 789. 
28
 In Section 6, I suggest that Rawlsian political liberals like N&D should not be concerned if moral 
autonomy is a by-product of some policy, provided the policy itself is neutrally justifiable. 
29
 N&D (op. cit. n.23), 98. 
30




A. Whether it should be taught as a norm of respectful discussion that students present 
neutral reasons, or whether respectful discussion is more about listening to one’s 
opponent and engaging seriously with their deepest, most important reasons. 
B. What should take priority as part of the compulsory curriculum: (i) discussion of political 
issues guided by a norm of neutral discourse, or (ii) engagement with comprehensive 
doctrines? N&D indicate that only (i) should be part of the compulsory curriculum. I do 
not commit to whether (i) should be compulsory, but say that (ii) should be part of the 
compulsory curriculum. 31 
My view leaves room for the possibility that neutral reason-giving be part of the compulsory 
curriculum, without absorbing all the debate taking place. The mandatory curriculum could 
provide opportunities both for discussion of comprehensive doctrines and for practising 
formulating public reasons, depending on the pedagogical aim of the lesson. 
In support of my view, I will provide a number of reasons to think that a norm of neutral 
discourse would pull against other things that reasonable people should value in future 
citizens, such as epistemic virtue, genuine mutual respect, and honesty. Whilst I seek to 
avoid taking a position on whether public justification is part of ideal political discourse, some 
of the points raised have negative implications for that ideal. However, I try to emphasise 
that these worries become especially acute when public reasoning is promoted as the norm 
for respectful discussion amongst children. There are a number of facts distinctive to this 
situation: 
1. Children are future, not current, political decision-makers. The argument for neutral 
discourse is usually reached via the argument that only neutrally justifiable policy is 
legitimate (see Section 2). But classroom discussions do not lead to the formation of 
public policy. The ideal classroom is a safe space where there is freedom to play with 
different ideas, with little serious consequence. 
2. The ‘common school’, where people from a diversity of backgrounds are brought 
together, is a unique and valuable setting. The opportunity to engage with such 
diversity is rarely found in the world outside. Moreover, the ideal classroom has the 
structure and discipline to engage with this diversity in an organised and sensitive 
way. 
3. Children are not autonomous or rational to the same extent that average adults are. 
Moreover, they are less likely to have fully-fledged, comprehensive sets of beliefs. 
Certainly, they rarely have what Rawls calls a ‘fully comprehensive’ conception, a 
‘precisely articulated system’.32 One implication of this is that it is not disrespectful of 
children (in the sense that Larmore is concerned with) to appeal to reasons that they 
do not accept. A second implication is that failing to talk about comprehensive 
doctrines has negative consequences that are not there in the case of adults. Since 
children are at a crucial stage in belief and character formation, there may be a 
responsibility to contribute to the development of good beliefs and character that is 
absent as a consideration when thinking about adults. 
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 Whether (ii) is compulsory has implications for the common school ideal. I support the idea that 
schools should be places of diversity, and this is implied by my view on the importance of 
encountering other comprehensive doctrines. However, this consideration does not necessarily weigh 
more heavily than considerations that support faith schools (such as freedom of religion), and so I do 
not commit to a view on this debate. 
32




In what follows, I try to show how these facts contribute to a norm of public reason-giving 
being particularly inappropriate for the classroom context. 
 
5. Arguments against neutral discourse in the classroom  
(A) Artificially restricts the content of discussion, pushing out important 
conversations about values 
N&D argue that compulsory debates designed to teach ‘adequate civic respect’ must be 
restricted to ‘fundamental political questions’.33 Yet as soon as we come to the practical 
question of which issues to select for discussion on the compulsory curriculum, we 
encounter the difficulty of drawing a line between the political and non-political sphere. We 
find that if a line must be drawn, this will be done so artificially and somewhat arbitrarily. 
N&D’s view therefore implies not only that we should exclude certain types of reasons, but 
also that we should exclude certain topics. 
Neufeld suggests the issue of legal recognition of gay marriage as an example of what might 
be discussed.34 Now clearly, secular arguments can be provided both for and against gay 
marriage. However, much of the strongest opposition to gay marriage is religiously 
motivated. Indeed, a major reason that disagreement runs so deeply here is because this is 
a question of faith for some people. For them, this is not a purely political issue, in the sense 
that it is not an issue that they can discuss meaningfully when detached from their religious 
views. 
Finding a purely political issue is a practical problem, but its roots are theoretical. Rawls 
argues that political liberalism presents a ‘freestanding liberal political conception that does 
not oppose comprehensive doctrines on their own ground’.35 He insists that ‘we always 
assume that citizens have two views, a comprehensive and a political view and that their 
overall view can be divided into two parts, suitably related’.36 But as we have seen in the 
example of gay marriage, this response is inadequate, for often people’s views cannot be 
neatly partitioned in the way that Rawls envisages. Often our comprehensive views, 
particularly if religious, inform our political views. 
Rawls’ view does not attend to the way that political and religious beliefs actually function in 
people’s lives. He argues that ‘political values … normally have sufficient weight to override 
all other values that may come in conflict with them’.37 This under-estimates how much there 
is at stake in one’s choice of comprehensive doctrine and how much weight people attach to 
their religious beliefs. 38 In reality, our choice of comprehensive doctrine affects how we 
prioritise different values, which then influences our viewpoint on even the most fundamental 
political matters. For many people, religion and politics have a deep and pervasive role in 
their lives, such that these domains cannot be compartmentalised without changing the 
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 Rawls (op. cit. n.8), xlvi. 
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 Rawls (op. cit. n.8), 138. 
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 Rawls (op. cit. n.8), 139. 
38
 Cf. M. Clayton and D. Stephens, ‘When God Commands Disobedience: Political Liberalism and 




nature of the truth-claims that are held (for example, by re-interpreting them as expressions 
of preference rather than claims about reality). The views held in one domain interact with 
and affect the views held in other domains, and it is for this reason that issues such as gay 
marriage are so difficult to negotiate in the complex, real world. 
In light of this, I do not think that it will be possible to find purely political issues for discussion 
that are at the same time important and meaningful. However, if we were to make this our 
aim, it would be at the expense of discussing more obviously partisan issues. This would 
represent a loss, for reasons that emerge throughout this paper. For now, it is worth 
highlighting three initial worries with restricting the content of discussion. 
Firstly, contemporary debates over values are precisely the sorts of issues we want the next 
generation of citizens discussing, for as adults, they need to be able to engage intelligently 
with these unresolved issues. Even if future public deliberation must be neutral, such 
deliberation will be more successful if we understand each other’s beliefs and values.39 
Secondly, there are benefits to be had from discussing values together. Kwame Appiah has 
argued that it is by evaluating stories together and talking about the values within them that 
we can begin to align our responses. Even where no ‘alignment’ of views is achieved, the 
process of discussing values helps ‘keeps our vocabulary of evaluation honed’, so that we at 
least have a shared moral vocabulary with which to engage with each other.40 This ‘shared 
vocabulary’ and ability to communicate over sensitive issues should be seen as important by 
anyone who values public deliberation amongst citizens. 
Thirdly, as we noted as our third fact in Section 4, children are still in a process of moral 
development. To deliberately avoid conversations about values leaves a gap in their 
education. Whilst it may be unacceptable from a political liberal perspective to teach that 
certain controversial values are the right values, this does not imply that schools must not 
talk about values at all. Nor does it imply that schools avoid partisan content. Many important 
conversations about values – such as forgiveness or charity – have traditionally been 
discussed as part of religious discourse, and these conversations are central to formulating 
values. By discussing partisan stories, such as the Christian Parable of the Lost Son, 
students are able to begin reflecting on these values. 
 
(B) Not conducive to reaching good answers 
An important reason for discussing values left out in the last section is that we want children 
to arrive at good answers to controversial questions. 41 As we noted in Section 4 as our first 
fact, the classroom should be a safe space where students can try out and play with different 
answers to controversial questions. To restrict classroom discussion to only public reason-
giving would be to give up too early: we want young people to make good decisions on how 
to answer controversial questions, rather than (or in addition to) knowing how to proceed if 
and when disagreements prove intractable. 
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 See §G below for further discussion of this point. 
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 K. A. Appiah, Cosmopolitanism (London: Penguin, 2007), 30. 
41
 We might also talk about ‘finding the truth’ or ‘getting right answers’, but I avoid this in order to 




Restricting classroom discussions by a norm of neutral discourse will often require that 
students leave out what they believe to be the most salient reasons. This is like asking 
someone to solve a mathematics problem without using the method that they find most 
fruitful. By asking people to put aside what they believe to be the most pertinent 
considerations, we blunt the tools at our disposal for reaching the best answers. 
A norm of neutral discourse encourages people to cite reasons that are not the ones that 
really motivate them, and this may also prove obstructive to reaching good answers. A trivial 
example might help to demonstrate this point. You say ‘Come for a drink with me at the 
George.’ I tell you ‘I’m too tired’. In response, you provide various counter-arguments: ‘You’ll 
wake up once we’re out.’ ‘The enjoyment you get will make it worthwhile.’ ‘We’ll only go for 
one.’ None of these reasons will make any impact on me, because even though I am tired, 
my real motivation is that I am avoiding one of the bar staff after an embarrassing drunken 
liaison with them last night. It seems like there is something pointless about this exchange. 
Since I keep silent about my deepest concern, I do not allow for the possibility that my worry 
is addressed. I am left worried, and you are left offended that none of your counter-
arguments changed my mind.  
The same is true for more serious examples. Imagine a classroom discussion on gay 
marriage. Jenny is an evangelical Christian student whose deep opposition to gay marriage 
is primarily motivated by her belief in the divine truth of Leviticus 18.22. Jenny obediently 
follows the ‘rules of the debate’, defending her opposition to gay marriage with the public 
reason that it will negatively impact children.42 However, since the impact on children is not 
her deepest concern, it is likely that when faced with counter- arguments from her peers, 
Jenny will continue to defend her opposition to gay marriage. Even if the impact on children 
does concern Jenny, the way she assesses the evidence that is presented to her regarding 
the impact on children will be affected by her deepest beliefs, because how we weigh 
reasons is affected by our ‘ultimate’ reasons. This is why we must bring these ‘ultimate’ 
reasons to the fore. Jenny will only be persuaded to change her mind on gay marriage by 
either being shown that her deeply held belief is wrong, or by being shown that she should 
depart from that belief on this occasion. Both of these options require engaging in 
controversial questions that fall clearly outside the political realm, such as questions 
surrounding biblical interpretation and the existence of God. Even if it is unlikely that Jenny 
will change her mind, it seems more conducive to resolving the issue to broach these 
questions than it is to engage in an obfuscatory discussion that fails to get to the heart of the 
matter. 
In fact, there is some reason for optimism about the benefits that discussion can bring for 
reaching better answers. Drawing on recent empirical research, Mercier and Sperber point to 
the epistemic gains that come from reasoning together. Reasoning as a group helps us 
correct flaws and formulate better, wiser beliefs.43 This is particularly so with children, who 
often are not as wedded to their professed beliefs as are adults and so are more likely to 
revise them in light of discussion. 
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 Interestingly, this neutral reason is often included in public statements by evangelical Christian 
organisations; see Steven Kettell, ‘Always Read the Label: The Identity and Strategy of Britain's 
“Christian Right”’, Politics, Religion & Ideology 17:1 (2016), 1–17. 
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Where discussion does lead to good answers, and perhaps even consensus, we can have 
greater confidence in the longevity of this result when it is achieved without a constraint of 
neutral discourse. Consensus reached via neutral discussion will not be as strong, 
meaningful or long-lasting, because it is based in reasons partially made up in order to get 
the other side ‘on board’. In contrast, if consensus is based in values to which the 
participants are truly invested, participants are more likely to believe in, and abide by, the 
results of these discussions.  
 
(C) Too narrow understanding of the purpose of discussion 
So far we have worried about the consequences of artificially restricting the content of 
discussion (§A) and about neutral discourse obstructing the search for good answers (§B). A 
third worry reminds us that discussion may have other aims beyond reaching good answers 
and that forgetting this may lead to something of value being lost. 
Larmore’s ‘norm of rational dialogue’ is aimed at resolving disagreements in order to reach 
political settlements.44 He understands ‘justification’ as 
‘…a proof directed at those who disagree with us to show them that they should join 
us in believing what we do. It can fulfil this pragmatic role only by appealing to what 
they already believe, thus to what is common ground between us.’45 
William Galston has critiqued this for being ‘an excessively rationalistic account’ of 
dialogue.46 Galston rightly points out that the purpose of much dialogue is to ‘invite one’s 
interlocutor to see the world the way you do’. In which case, rather than prescind, we should 
be ‘stubbornly bearing witness to one’s stance at the precise point of difference’.47 This 
seems right, for many good discussions do not simply appeal to abstract reasons that any 
reasonable interlocutor will accept, but also appeal to experiences, with the aim of helping 
your opponent understand why you think what you think. 
This sharing of experiences need not always be done with the aim of getting your opponent 
to switch sides. When I ask my daughter why it is that she is so interested in Love Island, I 
hold no hope that she will convince me that there is value in this programme. Rather, I want 
to understand her better. There seems to be worth in people just being curious and 
interested in each other in this way. Even where there is little prospect of discussion 
changing minds or leading to consensus, there is value in understanding and engaging with 
those with whom you disagree. One might plausibly say that this is intrinsically valuable, but 
to be more palatable to a political liberal, one could point instead to the instrumental benefits 
of this engagement, including the value of forming relationships and being united in the 
pursuit of social harmony and good answers. 
The engagement that comes from sharing our personal stories and deepest beliefs gives 
value that public political discussions could never give, for it is these sorts of conversations, 
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where we try to fully attend to the other, that develop a sense of shared humanity and 
shared goals. Appiah argues that it is through engagement with the experiences and ideas 
of others that we can live peacefully together. Such conversations do not have to lead to 
consensus – indeed, he thinks they rarely will – rather, ‘it’s enough that it helps people get 
used to one another’.48 To make a slightly different point, and to frame it in the language of 
political liberalism: it is through these conversations that children will be better able to 
understand the reality, and permanence of, deep disagreement. 
To summarise, seeing discussion as a rationalistic exercise in public reason, aimed purely at 
consensus, may come at the expense of our attempts to understand each other. 
 
(D) Does not teach true respect 
As discussed in Section 2, those defending ideals of neutrality have often been motivated by 
a (broadly) Kantian understanding of respect. According to this view, acknowledging the 
rational nature of a person results in a constraint on the kind of reasons that are admissible 
for the exercise of coercion. It may be plausible to take from this that respect requires that 
coercive policy is neutrally justifiable. But the move from this to the idea that respect requires 
that discussion is neutral is far less plausible.49 Presenting reasons based on one’s 
comprehensive doctrine does not involve interfering with the person, for they are free to 
accept or reject the reasons. It is therefore unclear why discourse being non-neutral fails to 
respect a person’s rational nature. 
It might help to make this point clearer to think about what sorts of behaviours in a 
discussion would disrespect someone’s rational nature. One way would be to fail to provide 
reasons at all. Children sometimes get cut short with the retort ‘because I told you so’, which 
means something like ‘I am no longer willing to give you reasons and you should accept this 
on the basis of my authority’. If this is ever appropriate, it is because children are not yet fully 
rational beings. In many situations, giving this retort to an adult would disrespect their nature 
as a rational being, because it fails to engage with them as a being operating on the basis of 
reasons. It is not clear in what way giving reasons based on your comprehensive doctrine is 
similar to this, for in that case, you are still attempting to engage your opponent’s rational 
nature. 
One might plausibly think that it is far more respectful to listen to what people genuinely care 
about, and to attempt to, as far as possible, take these reasons into account. In similar vein, 
Galston suggests that we show others respect ‘when we offer them, as explanation, what we 
take to be our true and best reasons for acting as we do’.50 
This kind of genuine engagement with your opponent’s whole set of reasons might even be 
supported by further exploration of the Kantian notion of respect. Recognition of the rational 
will in a person has generally been taken to imply non-interference: we should let the person 
autonomously pursue their projects, rather than use the person as a means for pursuing our 
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own projects. But it is plausible to think that respect requires more than merely not 
interfering: perhaps active engagement is also required. If you have truly recognised the 
person as a being acting on reasons, then the correct response should be to engage and 
interact with these reasons. In cases where the other person is someone with whom you 
disagree, if we ‘stand back’ and reflect on them as a rational creature, then the response 
should be one resembling curiosity. Given that, like you, they seek the best answers to the 
very same questions, how is it that they have reached this viewpoint to which you object? 
What reasons are there for why they stand where they stand? 
In support of this understanding, we can note that one possible translation of ‘Achtung’, 
which was Kant’s term for the ‘motive of morality’, is ‘attention’. 51 This indicates that part of 
what Kantian respect requires is ‘really looking’. I suggest that in our context, children should 
be taught that responding to a person as a rational being should require really attending to 
that person – which implies attending to, and engaging with, their deepest reasons. 
We might go further and say that restricting classroom discussion to only public reasons is 
actually disrespectful. In asking that people set aside their deepest beliefs such as their 
religious convictions, it treats these beliefs as if they are subjective, personal preferences. 
One reason we expect a boss to set aside her preference for her son getting a job is 
because this is a local preference – her reason has weight only for her. In contrast, most 
religious people hold their religious beliefs as claims about how things really are. They see 
these as objective truths, of universal relevance, rather than mere expressions of 
preference. It may be disrespectful to fail to acknowledge religious beliefs as potentially 
having such weight. 
Given all of this, it seems plausible to say that a focus on presenting neutral reasons would 
not be sufficiently respectful. A better way to be respectful in public discussion would be to 
be truthful about our different reasons and to try to get to the bottom of where, at root, we 
disagree. 
The defender of neutral deliberation may say that the above comments misfire in searching 
for why respectful discussion should be neutral discussion. They may insist that neutral 
deliberation follows directly from the requirement for neutrally justifiable policy, since 
deliberations feed into policy. But to argue this seems to be to give up too early on the 
possibility that meaningful agreement on some issue is possible whilst still bringing in 
comprehensive doctrines. Before we deliberate on an issue, we do not yet know the range of 
reasons that people think bear on the issue and whether we can agree. Moreover, it is 
possible for policy-making to be based on neutral reasons despite deliberation not having 
been neutral. This point seems especially important in the classroom context, where 
deliberation is not aimed at forming public policy (the first fact in Section 4). Rather, here we 
have an educational context, where students are learning about the process of reason-giving 
and the range of views that people hold. 
 
(E) Conflicts with cultivating epistemic virtue 
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Defending a version of political liberalism, Martha Nussbaum implicitly raises a worry with 
focusing on public reason-giving in the classroom: ‘for a public official in a leading role to say 
‘X’s doctrine is not as well grounded as Y’s’ is … to denigrate X’.52 This implies that ‘teachers 
in public schools should not say that argument is better than faith as a general way of 
solving all problems in life’.53 Her concern is that if teachers say that non-partisan, secular 
reasons are better than religious reasons, then this would be doing precisely what political 
liberalism seeks to avoid: it would be taking a stand on a controversial issue on which the 
state should remain neutral. 
The political liberal can respond as follows: the teacher (qua ‘public official’) is not saying 
that non-partisan reasons are better reasons. They are merely saying that in a specific 
realm, that of public political issues, partisan reasons are not the right sort of reasons to 
bring in. It may be for this reason that Nussbaum allows that ‘teachers in public schools … 
recommend argument over faith … for the purposes of citizenship’ and says that ‘in contexts 
where citizens of many different views debate about fundamental matters, rational argument 
is crucial.’54  
Nussbaum’s view appears to be that how the teacher fulfils his role of neutral ‘agent of the 
state’ depends on the topic of discussion. When discussing purely political issues, the 
teacher should require that students give neutral reasons. Elsewhere, the teacher must not 
recommend secular over religious arguments, because he must avoid taking a stand on any 
comprehensive doctrine. But as was discussed earlier (§A), this relies on a distinction 
between the political and non-political realm that cannot easily be drawn. If the curriculum 
avoided all content that implies the falsity of a controversial ‘doctrine’, then this would involve 
leaving out important topics. In order to teach areas of the curriculum that would normally be 
considered non-political (the obvious example here is parts of the Science curriculum such 
as cosmology and evolutionary theory), the teacher must take a stand on controversial 
issues. To avoid these topics and restrict content to that which has no implications for 
comprehensive doctrines (if such content exists) would be to fail in the school’s 
responsibilities towards cultivating an informed citizenry. 
But to implement an ideal of neutral discourse would not only fail to impart certain content. If 
there is a ban on certain types of reasons in the classroom, there is a missed opportunity to 
discuss the weight that different types of reasons should hold, and in doing so, teach 
important epistemic skills and virtues. It is right to acknowledge that there is deep 
disagreement over the best methods for reaching truth (for example, over the weight that 
should be given to scientific evidence when this is in opposition to revelation). However, 
there is also widespread agreement that some methods are better at tracking the truth than 
others. For teachers to pretend otherwise in the interests of neutrality would be to fail in their 
responsibilities to cultivate epistemically virtuous individuals, equipped with the ability to 
discriminate between good and bad sources of knowledge. Nussbaum may be right that it is 
not the business of a pluralistic society to see adults as inferior because of their epistemic 
failures, but it is surely part of the business of a school to teach in a way that guards children 
against epistemic failures. 55 
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One source of the difficulty here is that, just as we cannot easily separate off political from 
non-political issues, we cannot separate off civic education from other types of education. 
This is because a good citizen will be one who is able to distinguish between plausible and 
implausible reasons on a broad range of topics – they are good decision-makers. On a basic 
level, we want citizens who function well. We want citizens who go to the doctor when they 
are ill, rather than rely solely on prayer or their local shaman. We want citizens who 
understand what scientists tell them about the causes and effects of climate change, and 
who adapt their behaviour in response to reliable advice. 
This links with our third fact from Section 4: in the classroom we have people whose belief-
sets and characters are still forming. Since schools will unavoidably influence the formation 
of belief-sets and characters, they should aim to do so responsibly. This includes the 
formation of epistemic skills and virtues, which one might see as basic ‘life skills’, the 
teaching of which is therefore justifiable even from a minimalist political liberal perspective. 
What are the practical implications of this? We need to find a balance between on the one 
hand, being so ‘neutral’ as to imply that all reasons are equally good reasons (which would 
be to fail to help students reach a basic level of epistemic virtue), and on the other hand, 
undermining the beliefs of some students by telling them that their reasons are illegitimate. 
Though the teacher should not be pronouncing that some reasons are illegitimate, this will 
be implied by both the content of what they teach (ostensibly non-political topics which have 
implications for the truth of certain comprehensive doctrines) and their approach to some 
problems (for example, valuing scientific evidence over the Bible when teaching about the 
origins of human life). At the same time, teachers should make clear that this hierarchy of 
reason-types remains the subject of some controversy and so is legitimately ‘up for 
discussion’ in the context of discussing controversial issues. 
The teacher should not be policing the boundaries of what constitute legitimate reasons to 
put forward in discussion. The students themselves can discuss and provide arguments 
against partisan reasons that they deem poor reasons. This way, the teacher avoids 
undermining student beliefs in the way that Nussbaum worries about. If the ‘student policing’ 
is not working, teachers can (and should) be able to flag that some methods of reasoning 
have achieved wider consensus or historically been more fruitful than others. 
To summarise, it is through discussions involving partisan justifications that students can be 
taught the epistemic skills that help them discriminate between good and bad reasons. 
 
(F) Conflicts with cultivating other civic virtues 
Neutral classroom discourse may also come at the expense of other civic virtues, including 
honesty, candour and tolerance. 
By asking people to present neutral reasons rather than those that are most important to 
them, this encourages citizens to be dishonest. It makes them pretend to be concerned with 
reasons that in fact do not really motivate them. This becomes clearer when we think back to 
the example of Jenny’s opposition to gay marriage (§B). Although Jenny may genuinely 
believe that same-sex parenting is bad for children, to put forward this reason as her main 




she may even admit that this secular reason only has force for her (if it has force at all) 
because of her prior belief that homosexual relations are God-forbidden and thus sinful. 
A norm of neutral discourse also encourages a lack of candour. It asks that students wear a 
cloak over their deepest beliefs and motivations. Eamonn Callan has argued that candour is 
‘a cardinal virtue in a democratic culture of free speech’.56 We need candour as a condition 
of free speech, so that viewpoints can be aired and discussed. As such, a lack of candour is 
bad for the pursuit of truth.57 
Neutral discourse is also obstructive to teaching tolerance, which almost all liberals writing 
on education agree is an important civic virtue. One reason why Bernard Williams described 
tolerance as ‘at once necessary and impossible’ is because one can only be tolerant in 
response to something that one truly, deeply cares about. 58 If students discuss using only 
reasons which all reasonable people accept, then there is little opportunity to show and 
develop tolerance. In contrast, where students are allowed to bring in the values that they 
care most about, there is the opportunity to show the deep respect that allows someone to 
hold their view even though you vigorously disagree with them. 
As we noted as our second fact in Section 4, schooling is a golden opportunity for 
encountering disagreement: the ideal classroom has a diversity rarely found in the stratified 
world of adult life. Moreover, it is an environment where disagreements can be carefully 
structured and sensitively arbitrated according to the rules of the classroom. To restrict 
classroom discussion by a norm of neutral discourse means missing opportunities to 
develop the civic virtues that are required when encountering real, uncomfortable 
disagreement. 
 
(G) Not the best instrument for teaching the art of giving public reasons 
Even if we assume that a primary purpose of classroom discussion is to help prepare 
students for future public discussions guided by a norm of neutral discourse, it is not clear 
that the instrument that N&D suggest is the most effective one. Presumably N&D’s thought is 
that through their attempts at neutral discussion, students will come to realise what 
constitute neutral reasons. A student might, for example, attempt to argue against abortion 
by saying that it is murder, but upon discussion find that her reasons for thinking this are not 
shared and are part of her comprehensive doctrine. 
Though this may be effective, it is not clear why this method should be more effective than 
allowing critical discussion of non-neutral reasons. If a student puts forward the reasons that 
really matter to her, and allows these to be the subject of discussion by her peers, then she 
will better understand how these views differ from those of others. By seeing how people 
from a diversity of backgrounds respond to her view, she will begin to understand the 
influence of her identity, background and comprehensive doctrine. In contrast, if she is only 
ever able to put forward public reasons, it will be hard to form a view on what can and cannot 
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be reasonably rejected. It may even be impossible to do so without knowledge and 
understanding of the comprehensive doctrines of her peers. Therefore, even if we accept the 
importance of citizens knowing the art of public reason-giving, we can still take the view that 
engaged, critical discussion of comprehensive doctrines deserves greater priority on the 
curriculum than neutral discussion of public political issues.  
 
6. An objection and reply 
Political liberals will object that by advocating critical discussion of comprehensive doctrines, 
this puts moral autonomy on a pedestal. Since the value of moral autonomy is disputed, the 
view outlined above is just another part of the problem of disagreement, when what we 
needed was a solution that can be agreed upon by reasonable people. 
In response, we can remind the objector that the starting point here was not the value of 
(moral) autonomy. My emphasis on critical discussion of comprehensive doctrines came as 
a response to the problem of reasonable disagreement, the same problem that political 
liberals are concerned with. I am not asserting that critical discussion of comprehensive 
doctrines be hailed as valuable in its own right. The aim of students bringing their 
comprehensive doctrines into the classroom is not that they develop a critical stance toward 
that comprehensive doctrine. Rather, I have argued it is a means to, and sometimes 
necessary for, various other goods. These are the sorts of goods that political liberals can 
agree are within the legitimate scope of a minimal, compulsory civic education. For example, 
I have suggested that critical discussion of comprehensive doctrines helps to develop civic 
and epistemic virtues, and provides opportunities to practise these virtues through the 
encounter with real disagreement. It encourages citizens who are able to weigh in 
intelligently on pressing disputes, and who have thought about how best to answer 
contemporary problems. It helps ensure social cohesion and a peaceful society, by 
encouraging shared experiences and a shared language with which to discuss pressing 
issues. It encourages a truer, longer-lasting respect.  
It may be that moral autonomy is developed as a by-product of cultivating these various 
goods. If this is so, then the outcome of a policy requiring critical discussion of 
comprehensive doctrines is non-neutral. But it would be inconsistent for a political liberal to 
object to the policy on this basis. This is because political liberals usually insist that they are 
concerned not that policies have neutral effects, but that they have neutral justifications. 59 
Since critical discussion of comprehensive doctrines can be justified with reference to goods 




It may be that political liberals are right and that for a policy to be legitimate, it must have a 
neutral justification. I have argued that even if this is so, this does not imply that classroom 
discussion should operate according to a similar norm of neutrality. Children can be taught 
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that if and when they obtain the power to make decisions that have implications for the 
freedom of others (in the legislature, or as a voter), they should do so on the basis of public 
reasons. They can be taught this without neutral discourse constraining classroom 
discussion, and indeed, I have argued that they will better understand what constitute public 
reasons if this norm does not operate. 
We have seen that a norm of prescinding from controversial views would clash with other 
desiderata valued by reasonable people, including the need to have citizens who understand 
each other, who are capable of tolerance, and who make reasonable epistemic judgements, 
especially on contemporary topics of dispute. If we focus exclusively on teaching children to 
deal with the irresolvability of disagreement, we give up too early. At this foundational stage, 
where we have before us children rather than policy-makers, we should be more interested 
in students trying to resolve disagreements.  
The argument in favour of neutral classroom discourse relied on a mistaken understanding 
of civic respect. Rather than respect requiring that we avoid bringing in comprehensive 
doctrines, being respectful is about engaging meaningfully with those with whom we 
disagree, over the reasons that we care most deeply about. This should be the focus of 
schools aiming to meet the Government’s requirement to teach ‘mutual respect’. Fulfilling the 
policy will involve hearing children’s true reasons for their beliefs surrounding pressing, 
controversial issues. 
So, at the level of classroom discussion, public reason-giving should not be enforced as a 
norm for respectful discussion. Even if we do want children to learn the art of giving public 
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